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Abstract
Mr. Christopher dicusses the three key external factors in the success that were achieved
during the Carter Administration. They are people, process and a profession.
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Warren Christopher*
Largely because of events that took place in the closing weeks
and days, even hours and minutes, of the Carter Administration-
indeed, to be candid about it, in the minutes after we had lost our
legal status as public officials in that Administration-the past year
has been one of more visibility and notoriety than had been my
custom.
These have been unusual days and nights; and tonight, of
course, is no exception.
I have found it useful throughout to keep in mind a phrase
from Augustine: "The sufficiency of my merit is to know that my
merit is not sufficient."
Rather than talk about the specifics of the Iran hostage crisis or
some other adventure or misadventure in the State Department, it
strikes me that it might be better to talk about what I regard as the
key external factors-external to me-that were involved in what-
ever success we achieved. There are three principal ones. As it
happens, they are nicely alliterative-people, process, and a profes-
sion.
By referring to people, I mean to convey that any diplomatic
endeavor, especially one as complex as the negotiations to free our
hostages from Iran, is in every sense a collective enterprise. Hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of people were involved, nearly all of
them laboring out of the spotlight. The Iran crisis drew on the
talents and energies not only of lawyers but of career diplomats,
politicians, economists, linguists, bankers and businessmen of all
kinds, scholars of Islam, psychologists, security experts, physicians,
secretaries, cryptologists, and people from dozens of other disci-
plines.
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These scores of people brought extraordinary talent, sensitivity
and diligence to the task. Indeed, when I contemplate the difficult
circumstances and sparse resources that are often the lot of our
public servants, I marvel that we were-in this instance, I would
say I was-so well served by such skilled and devoted people.
That is why, when I have been recognized for my role in the
hostage negotiations, I have always felt that I was in the position of
a delegate, being honored not for my individual part, but as a
representative of all the other people who helped bring the Iran
crisis to a happy conclusion.
The decisive role of public servants is also a reason why I
worry about the way we, as a country, tend to neglect the growing
needs of our diplomatic establishment. For example, we presently
have diplomatic relations with 134 countries-53 more than we
dealt with in 1960. Our foreign service has not grown accordingly.
Indeed, it is roughly the same size as it was in 1960. And the same
number of people must not only deal with 53 more countries, but
with a much broader and tougher range of issues as well.
Thus, as we assess the wisdom of a given set of national budget
priorities, we would do well to focus on the line between prudent
economizing and mindless dereliction in the protection of our inter-
national interests.
While I favor increased funds for the Armed Forces, it should
be said that the Department of Defense is not the only agency
involved in protecting our national security. Every budget cut out-
side the Defense Department is not automatically a wise budget
cut.
To take a very current example, the Administration proposes
to reduce funds for the scholarship program for foreign students in
the United States. So often these students become leaders abroad,
and carry with them throughout their careers an enhanced under-
standing of the United States, its people and its problems. That is a
program that should be increased, not cut.
It is time to stop short-changing our international programs
and our diplomatic establishment. They are indispensable elements
in protecting our national security.
The second external influence was a process, and by that I
mean the process of diplomacy-of talking, and listening, and
using various kinds of leverage-to resolve or avoid disputes.
I am an unabashed and unashamed advocate of this method,
particularly in international affairs. Usually the process is not glam-
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orous. It can severely tax the patience, especially of those who think
our problems should have swift, simple, dramatic solutions.
But diplomacy has so many advantages over the alternatives.
As opposed to doing nothing, diplomacy is a way to defuse differ-
ences that might otherwise grow into disruptions. In contrast to the
impetuous employment of lethal force, it is much safer, cheaper,
and infinitely more precise.
There are some prominent areas now in which our interna-
tional interests could be better served if diplomacy were more
diligently pursued. Let me mention just two:
Next month, the 10th month of the new Administration, repre-
sentatives of the United States and the Soviet Union are at last
scheduled to renew the long effort to limit nuclear arms. These
talks, however, are to be focused on so-called "theater systems,"
which means only the weapons based in or targeted upon European
countries. As yet there is still no plan to address the central strategic
systems by which the United States and the Soviet Union threaten
each other directly.
Meanwhile, the arsenals of both sides have continued to grow,
not granting us more security, but instead assuring us higher costs
and a more perilous future. I regret that so much precious time has
been spent posturing, and so little has been done to get serious talks
underway.
One of the costs of the delay is that we are facing a Soviet-
supported peace offensive in Europe. The Administration's appar-
ent disinterest in arms control has given the Soviets a stellar oppor-
tunity to split the NATO Alliance, by undermining the popular
consensus upon which it depends.
The division between the industrial nations of the Northern
Hemisphere and the developing countries in the Southern Hemi-
sphere is another area in which authentic dialogue is needed and
has been neglected. Beginning tomorrow in Cancun, Mexico, the
leaders of 22 countries, including the United States, will begin a
summit discussion on North/South issues. The follow up will be
vital. It is critical that we demonstrate that we are interested in the
developing countries not simply as pawns or prizes in the rivalry
between East and West, not as the object of a patronizing or smug
lecture, but as independent nations with a claim of their own to our
attention and concern.
There are many international challenges on the horizon. How-
ever, our international record-and many of our other relation-
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ships-will turn most of all on how we manage, or fail to manage,
our relations with these two centers of influence, the Soviet Union
and the nations of the developing world.
Along with people and a process-that of diplomacy-the
third external factor that I have found important is a profession, the
profession of the law. Specifically, I refer to the lessons learned in
the practice of law and especially in the trial of cases. These lessons,
of course, are familiar to everyone in this room, and I can therefore
refer to them in a shorthand fashion.
The lesson of preparation is vital. There could have been no
movement in Algiers in December and January if there had not
been a team of diplomats and lawyers working in my back room
since September, preparing our position, drafting alternative ap-
proaches, and documenting our case.
The lesson of persistence and stamina has a great deal of
practical value. It was essential to keep pressing and probing until
an approach acceptable to both sides could be found. When our
profession urges us to walk to the center of problems, and then to
examine them from every outside angle, it is an invaluable teacher
for many other endeavors.
On the stamina point, perhaps I will simply say, somewhat
ironically, that it is my observation after quite a lot of experience,
that the one indispensable qualification for service at a high level in
the government and for heading a trial team is stamina-which I
confess may be much more a matter of genes than of genius.
Another useful lesson of our profession can be called "rolling
with the punch." It suggests taking the other party's best shots on
the shoulder, not on the jaw, to avoid a knockout and to permit yet
another response. In the hostage negotiations, the Iranians at times
took positions which were totally unacceptable and seemed to sig-
nal a backtracking from positions they had already taken. Rather
than let the enterprise collapse, it was necessary to deflect the hard
knocks, but also to show that we would stay in the ring.
And a final lesson of the law is the lesson of equanimity-the
recognition that in a long and difficult matter, there will be ups and
downs, good days and bad, and you just have to persevere.
In short, I am persuaded that my good fortune in having the
opportunity to study law, to practice, and to try cases, helped us
find our way through the problem with Iran. Certain habits of
thinking, techniques of dispute resolution, and methods of expres-
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sion-these were certainly not unique with me, but rather are
almost second nature to most members of our profession.
From what I have said thus far, I think you can see that it was
not the skill of a single negotiator-but mainly the impact of scores
of other influences-that brought the hostage crisis to a satisfactory
resolution.
Therefore, I am pleased and honored to accept the Fordham-
Stein Award-
But only on behalf of people I will always appreciate and
respect . ..
But only as an advocate of a process-that of diplomacy-to
which I am deeply committed . . .
But only as a representative of a profession-that of the law-
to which I shall always be grateful.

